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BOOK REVIEW
FEDERAL COURTS, CASES AND MATERIALS. BY DAVID P. CURRIE.
St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company. Second Edition 1975. Pp. xli,
1040. $17.95.
When and how to teach federal jurisdiction and procedure has been a
source of continuing debate. Until the publication of Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System in 1953 federal jurisdiction was often
treated in the same course with such procedural problems as discovery and
multi-party actions. In general, the approach to jurisdictional issues could be
described as practice oriented. Many courses still follow this model, especially at schools where problems of federal jurisdiction and procedure are
not treated in the first year civil procedure course.
Professor David Currie's book, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials, like
Hart & Wechsler,I departs from the traditional pattern. It does not purport
to cover federal practice as such. While it can be used to teach the "rules"
of federal jurisdiction, its main concern is with basic policy questions in
maintaining a federal system of courts. It is a book that can probably be used
most effectively with students who already have had both an exposure to the
fundamentals of federal jurisdiction in a basic civil procedure course and a
course in constitutional law.
At the time the first edition of Federal Courts was published in 1968 there
was a compelling need for a more current treatment of the subject area than
was afforded by Hart & Wechsler's 1953 book. This need was created by the
Warren Court's expansion of federal jurisdiction and federal remedies. In
the seven years between the publication of the first and second editions of
Currie's book, there were also a number of significant Supreme Court
decisions. Some 2 were characteristic of the expansive jurisdictional3 trend
of the Warren Court, and others4 of the more restrictive approach of the
Burger Court. These decisions necessitated extensive changes in three areas
of the book. Chapter 1, Section 3 on justiciability and standing has been
extensively revised with an additional fifty-eight pages. Twenty-five pages
have been added in Chapter 2, Section 2 on federal habeas corpus. In
1. Comparison will be made throughout this review to P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO,
& H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d
ed. 1973 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as Hart & Wechsler]. It is not my intention to
slight the other casebooks on this subject matter; Currie's book, however, is closest in
approach to Hart & Wechsler. Also, comparison with Hart & Wechsler comes more easily as I
was exposed to the first edition of the book as a student of the late Henry Hart.
2. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
3. I am using the term "jurisdictional" broadly to include such limiting doctrines as
equitable restraint, abstention, justiciability, standing, mootness, ripeness, etc.
4. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S: 37 (1971); Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332 (1969).
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Chapter 5, Section 4, "Injunctions Against Suit," thirty-one pages have
been added and only one principal case remains.
The pace of change in the field of federal jurisdiction and federal courts
has not slowed but only shifted direction; as a result, this area continues to
be one where casebooks are subject to rapid obsolescence. In the two years
since the publication of the second edition of FederalCourts, intervening
changes have been almost as dramatic as those of the seven years between
the first and second editions. A few such recent developments have been
legislative, notably the repeal of sections 2281 and 2282 and the amendment
of section 2284 of the Judicial Code, 5 which have the effect of rendering
moot most of the learning on three-judge federal courts. Also noteworthy is
the amendment of section 1331(a) to abolish .the jurisdictional amount requirement in "any action brought against the United States, any agency
thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.''6 But
most of the important changes have been wrought by Burger Court decisions
which, with a couple of exceptions, 7 have expressed that Court's generally
8
restrictive jurisdictional approach.
Many of the strengths of this book, when seen in a different perspective,
are also weaknesses. The brevity of the book will make it attractive to some
teachers, but I suspect that most instructors will find one or more areas
which are inadequately treated. While Hart & Wechsler's casebook tends to
separate materials which logically might be arranged together, 9 Currie often
runs together topics which might better be separated. Nevertheless, Currie's
notes are often thought provoking, challenging the student to avoid pigeonholing legal concepts into rigid categories. The author draws analogies and
comparisons which encourage the student to identify common threads between what at first seem to be unrelated concepts. ° At times, however, he
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282, 2284 (1970).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2,
90 Stat. 2721.
7. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding a Georgia Supreme
Court judgment which remanded an action for trial to be nevertheless "final" so as to permit
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970)); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (rejecting a claim of
mootness in a class action challenging a one year residency requirement for divorce).
In Sosna, however, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, went on to uphold the
statute, thus denying the requested federal remedy. This may be an instance of Justice
Rehnquist's willingness to ignore considerations of judicial restraint when to do so would
achieve a substantive result in accord with his ideological predispositions. See Shapiro, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 314-15 (1976).
There are other cases, such as Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), which, while
running counter to the "restrictive" trend, represent a partial backtracking from previous
decisions of the Burger Court which had the effect of restricting federal court jurisdiction.
8. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1(1976) (pendent
party jurisdiction); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (habeas corpus); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976) (justiciability and Younger doctrine); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)
(standing); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (Younger doctrine); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (habeas corpus and Younger doctrine); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975) (extended to state initiated civil proceedings); Harris County Commissioner's
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975) (abstention).
9. See Monaghan, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889, 895 n.28, 8% (1974).
10. In questioning Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) (p. 715),
which held 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) inapplicable to suits brought by the United States because of
the "old and well known rule" that "statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights
and privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without words to the effect," Currie raises
the question of whether this can be squared with the holding in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
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carries this too far and allows some of the notes to ramble. I would suggest
that in a subsequent edition of the book more attention be given to the
structuring of the notes. The headings preceding notes often are broader than
need be; if headings were further subdivided, a student would not be required
to read a single note series continuing for fifteen pages or more. This
division could be accomplished without destroying the cross-fertilization
value of many of the notes.
Currie deals briefly, some will find too briefly, with Supreme Court
review of state court decisions in connection with the problem of the socalled "adequate and independent state ground." There are only three
principal cases in the section. This material could be significantly improved
with only a short increase in length. I would suggest placing the note
material on Martin v. Hunter's Lessee" (pp. 189-90) and a slightly
lengthened version of the notes on Murdock v. Memphis 2 (pp. 191-92)
before Minnesota v. National Tea Co. 13 (p. 184). This would present a more
logical progression than the existing arrangement which has the note materials following the National Tea case.
The structure of Chapter 2, entitled "Appellate and Collateral Review in
the Federal Courts," is somewhat unusual in that the section on federal
post-conviction review is sandwiched between the section on the problem of
the adequate and independent state ground and "Miscellaneous Problems of
Review." Currie's arrangement, however, with Henry v. Mississippi14 (p.
202) immediately preceding the material on federal habeas corpus, provides
an opportunity to explore some fundamental policy considerations involved
in determining the extent to which a failure to raise an issue at trial or an
inadequate presentation at trial should preclude further litigation of that
issue. The problem is inherent in our adversary system of justice: When
should a client, particularly in a criminal case, be bound by the mistakes of
his counsel? It will be generally agreed that "non-harmful" errors-to the
extent that these can be identified-should not be the basis of either direct
or collateral challenge. Should a distinction be drawn between constitutional
and non-constitutional errors? Much more troublesome is the question of
whether we should try to identify only those errors which appear to go to the
guilt or innocence of the client, as suggested by the majority opinion in
Stone v. Powell. 15 Once these questions have been posed in a general way,
U.S. 184 (1964) (p. 568), which held FELA applicable to state-owned railroads without "express words to that effect."
In the notes following Younger v. Harris (p. 719), Currie discusses a series of cases dealing
with attempted injunction of court-martial proceedings and skillfully probes the differences
between these and the type of state-court proceedings involved in Younger as well as the extent
to which the availability of post-conviction review in either situation should bear on the
willingness of the federal courts to grant injunctions.
Finally, in note 6 on p. 910, Currie asks the student to compare the problem of the extent to
which state courts must follow "federal procedure" where federally created rights are at stake,
as in cases such as Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), and the problem of the socalled adequate state ground (pp. 202-12).
11. 3 U.S. (I Wheat.) 562 (1816).

12.
13.
14.
15.

87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
309 U.S. 551 (1940).
379 U.S. 443 (1965).
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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discussion can then be focused on the extent to which the answers should
differ depending on whether the particular error in question is raised on
direct review or in a collateral proceeding. For example, after discussing
Henry v. Mississippi, the teacher might ask whether the result would or
should be different if the question is raised in a habeas corpus petition. The
bearing which considerations of federalism and comity may have on the
answers to these basic questions can fruitfully be explored in connection
with the facts of Henry v. Mississippi and again in connection with the
habeas corpus materials: i.e., should a federal court be more or less hesitant
to review an error alleged to have taken place in a state court proceeding
than one alleged to have occurred in the federal system?
Perhaps an orderly treatment of such an inherently disorderly subject as
federal habeas corpus is too much to expect.' 6 As in many other places in the
book, however, the note material on this subject could be more effectively
organized. There is a topic heading entitled "Notes on Habeas Corpus and
Section 2255" which begins on page 228 and continues for fifteen pages. The
note switches back and forth between state and federal custody cases; it
discusses the types of issues cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding, the
effect of a failure to raise the issue at a prior time, and the res judicata
problem. All, or at least some of these issues, could better be set forth under
separate note headings. I would suggest as a possible model the topic
headings Currie uses in his very readable Federal Jurisdiction in a Nutshell,' 7 or something along the lines used by Hart & Wechsler in their
chapter on habeas corpus. Also, it would be helpful to have a separate note
on pre-trial habeas corpus instead of including this in the materials on the
exhaustion requirement (pp. 268-74).
Currie treats pendent jurisdiction in one principal case, United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs1 8 (p. 388), and in a number of notes which raise questions
regarding the scope of the doctrine. The discussion of the problem of socalled "pendent party jurisdiction," and indeed perhaps some of the basic
16. A good example of how quickly a casebook becomes obsolete in this area is shown by
the extent to which the habeas corpus picture has changed in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977), Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). Francis and
Wainwright effectively undermine the landmark case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Stone, though not purporting to overrule Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), does
so in effect. Kaufman was a federal custody case arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), while
Stone was a state custody case arising under § 2254 (1970). A footnote to Justice Powell's
opinion in Stone stated:
Our decision today rejects the dictum in Kaufman concerning the applicability
of the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus review of state-court decisions
pursuant to § 2254. To the extent the application of the exclusionary rule in
Kaufman did not rely upon the supervisory role of this Court over the lower
federal courts . . . the rationale for its application in that context is also
rejected. 428 U.S. at 481-82 n.16.
This attempted distinction, while superficially plausible, is peculiar in view of the fact that
both the Government's brief and the majority opinion in Kaufman assumed the remedy sought
in that case would be available if involving a state prisoner. The Government unsuccessfully
argued there that a narrower scope of relief should be available to federal prisoners because
they have already had the benefit of a federal forum. 394 U.S. at 225.
17. D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL (1976).
18. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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touchstones of pendent jurisdiction, will have to be revised in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Aldinger v. Howard. 9 Discussion of the
related topic of ancillary jurisdiction is scattered several places throughout
the book, mainly in the chapter on diversity jurisdiction. It seems that much
could be gained by a parallel treatment. There has been a tendency in some
recent cases 20 to confuse the two doctrines or, depending on one's point of
view, to merge them. The argument for synthesis is that they are, or should
be, based on the same underlying policy considerations, but have heretofore
been artificially separated by the use of different labels. 2' However, in light
of the separate historical development of these doctrines reiterated and
stressed by the court in Aldinger, it would be worthwhile to spend some time
exploring the distinctions between the two as well as the common thread
between them.
I suspect that most teachers will give little attention to the chapter on
diversity jurisdiction, particularly if the students have been exposed to this
problem in a first year civil procedure course. Nevertheless, there is much
of value that can be found here, particularly if one is interested in probing
beyond the existing rules into the question of the continued justification, if
any, for diversity jurisdiction. After examining several problems involving
the tension between the Strawbridge v. Curtis22 complete diversity requirement and the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules, as well as the
"separate and independent claim" 23 quagmire, Currie gives us his own
conclusion: "If diversity is retained, Strawbridge ought not to be."124 His
description of the American Law Institute's proposal to deal with a so-called
"dispersed-party" problem (where there are several defendants who would
be regarded as "indispensable" but who are not all subject to process in the
same state) provides an illustration of the provoking, irreverent style used
by Currie throughout the book: "The proposal must be read in full hideous
detail to be appreciated . . . .What do you suppose is the extent of the
19. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1977), suggesting that the case has ramifications beyond the "pendent
party" situation, portending a closer look at the question of whether Congress has impliedly

excluded certain claims and remedies even in the ordinary pendent jurisdiction case. Indeed, it
is suggested that the outcome in Gibbs might be different if the court there had followed the
Aldinger analysis of congressional intent.

20. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968) ("pendent"
claim not involving a family member for less than $10,000 allowed against defendant in a
wrongful death claim); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966)
(father's claim for consequential damages which were no more than $2,000 allowed to be joined
with son's personal injury claim); Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964)
(permitting joinder, based on pendent jurisdiction, of a Survival Act claim involving nondiverse parties).
21. The argument in favor of a merger of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, based in part
on the enlargement of the scope of pendent jurisdiction in the Gibbs case, is that once a basis
for federal jurisdiction over one claim is established, the federal court would be given a
discretionary power to adjudicate all related claims arising out of the "same nucleus of
operative facts" or "same transaction or occurrence" regardless of whether the claims involve
the same or additional parties. Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a
Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. REV. 1263 (1975).
22. 1 U.S. (3 Cranch) 575 (1806).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970).
24. Page 475, quoting Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute, PartI,
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,34 (1968).
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problem that induces the ALI to concoct this monster? Is this an example of
' 25
the academic imagination running amok?
Professor Currie's treatment of the abstention doctrine provides another
illustration of his tendency to throw together materials which are only
tenuously connected under a common heading. In a fifteen-page series of
"Notes on Abstention in Non-Constitutional Cases" he includes a note on
the refusal of federal courts to take cognizance of cases pertaining to
matrimonial matters and decedents' estates (pp. 678-80). It would seem that
history, if not logic, would dictate the use of a separate heading for this
material. Although there is no lack of confusion along the borderlines of this
subject area, 26 it is fairly clear that the reason federal courts have refused to
entertain suits for divorce or petitions to probate a will has little to do with
the Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.2 7 line of cases. In the Pullmantype case there is jurisdiction within the terms of the Constitution and the
relevant statutes; the Supreme Court, however, has drawn on traditional
equitable principles to fashion a quasi-discretionary obligation of the federal
courts to delay the exercise of this jurisdiction based upon considerations of
judicial comity. 28 In contrast, the federal courts' refusal to grant divorces or
probate wills has been based upon the notion that there is a total lack of
jurisdiction-that these matters were not suits "at law or29 in equity" within
the meaning of article III, section 2 of the Constitution.
The note materials on abstention do a good job of illustrating what is
probably the most serious drawback of that doctrine-the extensive delays
involved in getting an authoritative decision from the state courts. The
dilemma posed by abstention in diversity cases such as LouisianaPower &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux 30 is also explored. Certification3 is mentioned as a way of avoiding delay and preserving the litigant's right to a
federal fact-finding forum. Unless the student reads these notes carefully,
however, he will come away with an unclear understanding of the difference
between the strict Pullman-type abstention and certification. This problem
could be solved by adding one or two paragraphs explaining the mechanics
of each device. Also, it seems to me that the problem of reviewability of
25. Pages 466-67. Compare the view of Judge Friendly, expressed in H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 152 (1973), that "if the ideal is to abolish the [diversity]
jurisdiction, Congress should not do anything to increase it, even by way of a partial trade-off."
While I share Judge Friendly's view that diversity jurisdiction is largely an unnecessary
anachronism, it seems to me that his reasons for retaining Strawbridge smack too much of an
attitude of "The worse things are, the better." Any statutory modification of the Strawbridge
rule should, however, be part of a wider ranging reform which would cut back diversity
jurisdiction in those instances where it is least justified, e.g., where a resident plaintiff sues an
out-of-state defendant in federal court in the resident's home state.
26. See Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13-31 (1956).
27. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

28. "An appeal to the chancellor.., is an appeal to the 'exercise of the sound discretion,
which guides the determination of courts of equity.' " 312 U.S. at 500.
29. There seem to be no reported cases in which a will has been presented to a federal court
for probate in the first instance. Will contest suits have presented more difficulty. The touchstone seems to be whether a given suit was really inter partes such as would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the English chancery courts, or regarded as inter partes in state practice. See,
Spencer v. Watkins, 169 F. 379 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 605 (1909); Wahl v. Franz, 100
F. 680 (8th Cir. 1900); In re Gilley, 58 F. 977 (C.C.D.N.H. 1893); Vestal & Foster, supra note
26, at 23-31.
30. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
31. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
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abstention orders is significant enough to merit explicit attention in these
32
materials.
In his treatment of equitable restraint (pp. 719-5 1) Currie follows a pattern
used too often throughout the book. He begins with a relatively recent
leading case-Younger v. Harris33-followed by a number of notes with
little regard for chronological development. In dealing with a doctrine such
as equitable restraint, which has changed contours with the composition of
the court and the political temper of the times, there is much to be said for
presenting the materials in an historical progression. Thus, I would suggest
starting with either a textual note or an edited version of Douglas v. City of
Jeannette,34 then progressing through Dombrowski v. Pfister35 to Younger
and the more recent cases.
The materials on civil rights removal are treated briefly, but well. The
positioning of these materials after those on injunction against state court
proceedings makes for an interesting comparison. At one level there can be
discussion of the merits of removal, as opposed to injunction, as an effective means of avoiding state court prosecutions. At another level the teacher
may delve into the implications of each of these two devices on "Our
Federalism": 36 which creates more friction between the two court systems?
Currie's treatment of Erie probably will not be satisfactory to those
teachers who think that this should be a major part of a course in federal
courts. I make the assumption, perhaps overly optimistic, that my students
have had sufficient exposure to the basic Erie sequence in their first year
civil procedure course and proceed immediately into a discussion of Klaxon
38
37
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. and Van Dusen v. Barrack.
Placing Van Dusen immediately following Klaxon seems logical and
pedagogically sound. On the other hand, the "Notes on the Place of Trial in
the Federal Courts" (pp. 853-69) seem to be inaptly placed in the chapter on
the choice of law in the federal courts. While some of these materials
logically relate to Van Dusen, this does not seem to be an appropriate place
to have a wide-ranging discussion of personal jurisdiction and venue.
I have a few minor technical criticisms of the casebook. Cross-references
to previous cases are sometimes hard to follow. For example, the discussion
32. For an excellent analysis of this problem see Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 592-601 (1977).
33. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
34. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
35. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). In the second edition Dombrowski has been deleted as a principal
case and relegated to a note. This is certainly defensible in view of the effect Younger had on
Dombrowski. I would have retained Dombrowski as a principal case, however, partially on the
grounds that Dombrowski was a case that was not only much written about but also figured
prominently, if not successfully, in many lower court cases. More importantly, I think it is
instructive to the student to have substantially the full text of both cases side by side in an effort
to discover why, apart from a change in the personnel on the court, Younger was decided the
way it was. On the facts, most students will say that there was a more realistic threat to
Dombrowski's right of free speech than to Harris's. Those more politically and historically
conscious are likely to point to the course of the civil rights and anti-war movements, as well as
the executive and judicial response to these movements between 1965 and 1971, as influencing
the outcome of Younger.
36. The phrase is used in Justice Black's majority opinion in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
37. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
38. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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of Williams v. Miller39 (p. 748) makes a reference to Terrace v. Thompson,'
briefly mentioned on page 746. Seven intervening cases and one law review
article are cited in between the two cases. Notes sometimes fail to give
enough facts to make sense of quotations excerpted from the decision. An
example of this is the note on Perez v. Ledesma 41 (p. 749). In addition, I
would prefer a separate supplement to having the statutory and rule material
as an appendix to the casebook. The latter arrangement makes it more
difficult to refer to the statutes at the time one is reading a case and tends to
render the casebook obsolescent when statutes are amended.
The choice of a casebook for a course in federal courts or federal jurisdiction will be heavily influenced by the curriculum structure and by the
teacher's predilections as to what should be included in the course. Those
who, for one reason or another, did not care for the first edition of Professor
Currie's book probably will find little in the second edition that will influence them to change their minds. 42 Although there has been some minor
restructuring of chapters, the second edition is essentially an updating of the
first. For those instructors who want to present more than a cursory treatment of the "case or controversy" materials, however, the doubling of the
space allotted to justiciability and standing should make the second edition
somewhat more acceptable than the first.
There are only a very few casebooks which one would recommend to a
student that he retain beyond his law school days as a continuing source of
reference. Hart & Wechsler's, The FederalCourts and the FederalSystem is
one such casebook. David Currie's FederalCourts is not; it can, however,
be a useful teaching tool. Currie covers many of the same subject areas as
Hart & Wechsler but does so more economically. Particularly for someone
who is teaching a two-or three-hour course and faced with a problem of
selection from the prodigious amount of material in Hart & Wechsler,
Currie's book is an attractive alternative. Unfortunately, many of the notes
are not self-teaching, although they can provide a basis for stimulating class
discussion if the teacher is willing to devote time to their explication. This
could be a vastly better book, however, if in the next edition Professor
Currie would devote additional time to revising and rearranging the note
material.
James M. Klebba*
39. 317 U.S. 599 (1942).
40. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
41. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
42. In reviewing the first edition of this book, Professor Monaghan criticized Professor
Currie's decision to minimize the "Case or Controversy" materials and the Erie doctrine.
Monaghan, Book Review, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1753 (1970). The former, in Currie's opinion,
should be left largely to the course on constitutional law; whereas the latter was to be left to the
conflicts teachers. To Monaghan both the case or controversy materials and the Erie doctrine
should be central to a course in federal courts. My inclination is to agree with Currie. Ideally, I
would like to spend more time on these two areas. With only a three-hour course, however, I
found there were enough other important topics to cover which are not systematically treated

elsewhere in the curriculum.
* B.A., St. John's University; J.D., Harvard University. Associate Professor of Law,
Loyola University, New Orleans, Louisiana.

